A Relationship Forged in Empire: A Comparative Analysis of Kurdish and Circassian Peoples

Introduction

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical and contemporary relationship between the Kurdish and Circassian peoples. It argues that their interactions, far from being self-determined, have been predominantly shaped and mediated by the policies of larger state powers, most notably the Ottoman Empire, its successor the Turkish Republic, and the Russian Empire. Their relationship is best understood not through direct, sustained contact, but through their differential positioning relative to state power. While both are significant non-Turkish Muslim peoples who have inhabited overlapping geopolitical spaces, their distinct origins, social structures, and historical traumas have produced profoundly divergent political trajectories. The Kurds, an indigenous people of the Middle East, have waged a continuous struggle against state centralization and for national rights, defining themselves in opposition to the states they inhabit. The Circassians, exiled to the Middle East following a genocide in their Caucasian homeland, have largely pursued a strategy of integration and loyalty to their host states, focusing their political energies on cultural preservation and historical justice.
To unravel this complex dynamic, this report employs a comparative-historical methodology, examining the two groups in parallel across key historical junctures. It draws on a wide range of sources to analyze their social structures, political trajectories, and inter-communal dynamics. The analysis begins by establishing the distinct foundational identities of each group, then traces their intertwined history through the Ottoman period, focusing on the critical turning points of the Circassian Genocide and the establishment of the Hamidiye Cavalry. It then analyzes their divergent fates in the post-Ottoman Middle East and the Soviet Union, and concludes with an examination of their modern diaspora politics and sociological interactions. By juxtaposing their experiences, this report illuminates how imperial and post-imperial statecraft creates and defines minority identities and shapes the very nature of their relationships with one another.

Section 1: Foundational Identities and Social Structures: A Comparative Overview

To comprehend the intricate relationship between Kurds and Circassians, it is essential to first understand their fundamentally distinct origins, languages, and societal frameworks. These foundational differences, established over millennia, are crucial for explaining their divergent responses to state policies and their limited organic interaction.

1.1 The Kurds: An Indigenous Iranic People of the Zagros-Taurus Mountains

Origins and Homeland: The Kurds are an Iranic ethnic group indigenous to a vast, mountainous region known as Kurdistan, a territory that today overlaps the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.[1] Their claim to this land is ancient, with historical roots traced back thousands of years. Some scholars and Kurdish tradition link them to the Medes of the ancient Medo-Persian Empire, who overthrew the Assyrian Empire in 612 BCE.[1] Other historical connections have been suggested to groups like the Kardouchoi, a mountain tribe mentioned by the Greek historian Xenophon in his
Anabasis as having attacked the "Ten Thousand" in 401 BCE.[2] The precise origin of the name "Kurd" is uncertain. One theory traces it to the Assyrian toponym "Qardu" in the upper Tigris basin.[4] Another suggests it may derive from the Middle Persian common noun *kwrt-*, meaning "nomad" or "tent-dweller," a term that became an ethnonym after the 7th-century Muslim conquests.[4] More recent DNA research complicates the purely linguistic classification, indicating that the ancestors of the Kurds were likely indigenous Neolithic peoples of the Northern Fertile Crescent who were later linguistically "Iranianized" by waves of Indo-European migrants from Central Asia.[6] Despite their long history and a global population estimated between 30 and 45 million, the Kurds remain the largest ethnic group in the world without a sovereign state of their own.[1]

Language and Religion: The Kurdish people speak Kurdish, a Western Iranic language belonging to the Indo-European family, closely related to Persian and Pashto.[2] The language is not monolithic; it comprises a collection of related dialects, the most prominent of which are Kurmanji (spoken primarily in Turkey and Syria), Sorani (spoken in Iraq and Iran), and various southern dialects.[3] These dialects can have significant differences in vocabulary and grammar, sometimes making mutual intelligibility a challenge.[5] Religiously, the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims adhering to the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, with a significant minority following the Hanafi school.[4] There are also substantial communities of Alevi and Shia Muslim Kurds, particularly in Turkey and Iran.[4] Sufism is also influential, with the Naqshbandi and Qadiriyya orders being prominent.[4]

Social Structure: The Primacy of the Tribe: The principal unit of traditional Kurdish society is the tribe, known as the *aşiret* (or *ashiret*), typically led by a powerful chieftain, or *agha*, or a religious leader, the sheikh.[2] Historically, the Kurdish way of life was a mix of nomadic pastoralism, herding sheep and goats across the highlands, and settled agriculture in the

valleys.[2] This tribal system is based on patrilineal descent, where several extended families form a lineage, several lineages compose a clan, and several clans constitute a tribe.[8] While kinship is the organizing principle, tribes have historically absorbed outside groups who, after several generations of loyalty, could become fully integrated members.[8] This decentralized social organization was often intertwined with a feudal system, where powerful tribal leaders served as landlords controlling vast territories and the non-tribal peasants who worked the land.[8] This deeply entrenched, tribally-defined territoriality has been a defining feature of the Kurdish relationship with larger empires for centuries, fostering a strong tradition of local autonomy and resistance to centralized control.[10] Kurdistan is home to a vast and complex mosaic of tribes, including prominent ones like the Jalali, Milan, Herki, Barzani, Jaff, and Bradost, among hundreds of others, each with its own history and territory.[11]

1.2 The Circassians (Adyghe): An Ancient Indigenous People of the Northwest Caucasus

Origins and Homeland: The Circassians, who refer to themselves as Adyghe, are an indigenous people of the Northwest Caucasus, originating from a historical region known as Circassia, which stretched along the northeast coast of the Black Sea.[15] Archaeological evidence, including impressive burial mounds and sophisticated metalwork from the Maikop culture, points to a stable and advanced civilization in this region since at least the third millennium BCE.[19] The name "Circassian" is an exonym of disputed origin, possibly from a Turkic term for "warrior killers" or a Persian term for "mountainous region".[17] They are a distinct ethnic group with no relation to Turkic peoples, a claim sometimes forwarded by pan-Turkic nationalists but widely refuted by linguistic and historical evidence.[17]

Language and Religion: The Circassians speak languages belonging to the Northwest Caucasian language family, which is considered a language isolate with no known relatives elsewhere.[20] The two main literary languages are Adyghe (Western Circassian) and Kabardian (Eastern Circassian), known for their highly complex phonological systems featuring an abundance of consonants and a scarcity of vowels.[15] Religiously, the Circassians were Christianized through Byzantine influence between the 6th and 12th centuries.[15] However, beginning in the 17th century, under the influence of the Ottoman Empire and its vassal, the Crimean Khanate, they gradually converted to Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school.[20] Despite this conversion, elements of their pre-Islamic pagan beliefs and Christian traditions have been preserved in their folklore.[15]

Social Structure: Feudal Hierarchy and the *Adyghe Xabze*: In stark contrast to the Kurdish tribal system, traditional Circassian society was organized along the lines of a rigid feudal hierarchy. At the apex were hereditary princes, followed by a complex system of nobles, commoners, and, until recent times, slaves.[23] This class structure was highly stratified, with titles like duke, marquis, and baron, and was reinforced by strict rules forbidding intermarriage between the classes to preserve "blue blood".[25] This society was governed by a unique and

all-encompassing code of conduct called the
Adyghe Xabze.[20] The
Xabze is more than just a legal code; it is a worldview and a set of moral-ethical principles that dictates every aspect of Circassian life, including honor, truthfulness, bravery, hospitality, and profound respect for elders and women.[27] This code, dating back thousands of years, serves as a powerful, unifying cultural force that transcends tribal divisions and provides a centralized framework for social conduct.[28] The Circassian nation is traditionally comprised of twelve principal tribes—including the Abzakh, Shapsugh, Kabardian, and Ubykh—each of which is represented by a star on their green and gold national flag.[18]

The foundational structures of these two peoples predetermined their differing modes of interaction with imperial powers. The decentralized, tribal nature of Kurdish society meant that an empire seeking control had to negotiate with or co-opt a multitude of local chieftains, a process that inherently fostered a dynamic of local autonomy and resistance to central authority.[32] Conversely, the centralized, feudal hierarchy of the Circassians provided imperial states with a pre-existing elite class that could be more readily integrated into the state's own military and bureaucratic structures.[35] This fundamental difference in social organization is a key variable that helps explain why Circassians were often perceived and utilized as agents of the state, while Kurds were frequently seen as a challenge to it.

Table 1: Comparative Social and Cultural Profile of Kurdish and Circassian Peoples

Category	Kurds	Circassians (Adyghe)
Ethno-Linguistic Origin	Iranic (Indo-European) [4]	Northwest Caucasian [17]
Traditional Homeland	Kurdistan (Zagros/Taurus Mountains) [1]	Circassia (Northwest Caucasus) [15]
Primary Language Family	Western Iranic [2]	Northwest Caucasian (isolate) [20]
Major Dialects/Tribes	Kurmanji, Sorani; Tribes: Jaff, Barzani, etc. [3]	Adyghe, Kabardian; Tribes: Abzakh, Shapsugh, etc. [15]
Traditional Religion	Sunni Islam (Shafi'i school), with Alevi & Shia minorities [4]	Sunni Islam (Hanafi school), formerly Christian [20]
Traditional Social Structure	Tribal (*Aşiret*) and Feudal; decentralized [7]	Feudal Hierarchy; princes, nobles, commoners, slaves [23]
Key Social/Legal Code	Tribal Law, Customary Law, Sharia [8]	*Adyghe Xabze* (comprehensive ethical & legal code) [28]

Section 2: The Ottoman Crucible: Forging a Complex Relationship (1860s-1923)

The late 19th and early 20th centuries represent the historical crucible in which the modern relationship between Kurds and Circassians was forged. This was not a period of organic interaction between two neighboring peoples but one of state-mediated proximity, driven by the dual crises of Russian imperial expansion and Ottoman internal decay. The Ottoman state's policies—specifically, the settlement of Circassian refugees and the creation of the Hamidiye Cavalry—brought the two groups into a complex and often fraught relationship, creating the conditions for both assimilation and conflict that would define their trajectories into the modern era.

2.1 An Empire of Refugees: The Circassian Genocide and Ottoman Settlement Policy

The long and brutal Russian conquest of the Caucasus, known as the Russo-Circassian War (1763-1864), culminated in a cataclysmic event that fundamentally reshaped the Circassian world: the Circassian Genocide, or *Tsitsekun*.[16] Between 1863 and 1867, the Russian Empire embarked on a systematic campaign of mass killing, ethnic cleansing, and forced deportation, aiming to permanently remove the Circassian people from their strategic homeland along the Black Sea coast.[22] The campaign was devastating, resulting in the violent death or expulsion of an estimated 95-97% of the entire Circassian population.[22]

Faced with this existential threat, up to 1.5 million Circassians were forced into exile, with the neighboring Ottoman Empire as their primary destination.[16] The Ottoman government, styling itself as a refuge for displaced Muslims and eager to repopulate territories after demographic losses in the Balkans, maintained an open-door policy for Caucasian refugees.[38] The journey, however, was horrific. Ottoman archives record the arrival of over a million immigrants from the Caucasus by 1879, but nearly half of them died en route or shortly after arrival from starvation, typhus, and smallpox in overcrowded and unsanitary refugee camps in Ottoman port cities.[22]

The Ottoman state's settlement policy for these refugees was not random but highly strategic. The government deliberately resettled the Circassians—a people with a formidable martial reputation—in sensitive and restive regions of the empire. They were placed in the Balkans to act as a loyal Muslim buffer against Christian nationalist movements, and in the Arab provinces of Syria and Jordan to counter powerful Bedouin tribes.[36] Crucially for this analysis, they were also settled in parts of Anatolia and Kurdistan, where the state saw them as a potential check on Armenian aspirations and Kurdish tribal power.[35]

2.2 The Kurdish Emirates and the Challenge of Centralization

While the Ottomans were absorbing Circassian refugees, they were simultaneously transforming their relationship with their long-standing Kurdish subjects. Since the Battle of

Chaldiran in 1514, the Ottoman state had managed its vast eastern frontier through a system of indirect rule, granting significant autonomy to hereditary Kurdish emirates.[32] In exchange for providing troops when needed and guarding the frontier against Persia, Kurdish tribal leaders were confirmed in their rule, which passed from father to son.[33] This arrangement preserved the decentralized, tribal power structure of Kurdish society for centuries.
However, the 19th-century *Tanzimat* reforms marked a decisive shift towards state centralization. The Ottoman government sought to abolish the old system of indirect rule and assert direct administrative and fiscal control over all its territories.[10] This meant dismantling the autonomous Kurdish emirates and ending the privileges of the tribal chieftains.[34] This policy was perceived by the Kurdish aghas and sheikhs as a direct assault on their long-held power and territoriality. Their response was a series of powerful revolts throughout the 19th century, led by figures such as Bedir Khan Beg and Sheikh Ubeydullah.[33] It is critical to note that these uprisings were primarily conservative reactions by a traditional elite to protect their established autonomy; they were not, at this stage, modern nationalist movements aiming for a unified, independent Kurdish state.[10]

2.3 Instruments of the State: The Hamidiye Cavalry

The culmination of Sultan Abdülhamid II's strategy to manage the empire's volatile eastern provinces was the creation of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments in 1891.[43] This irregular tribal cavalry, explicitly modeled on the Russian Cossacks who had so effectively pacified the Caucasus, serves as a microcosm of the complex, multi-layered relationship the Ottoman state forged between Kurds and Circassians.[44]
The composition and command structure of the Hamidiye were revealing. The rank-and-file of the regiments were drawn overwhelmingly from loyal Sunni Kurdish tribes.[43] However, the state placed them under a command structure influenced by and sometimes led by demonstrably loyal non-Kurdish elites. A pivotal figure was Zeki Pasha, the commander of the 4th Army to which the Hamidiye was attached, who was an Istanbul-born Ottoman of Circassian background.[43] This structure ensured that loyalty flowed vertically to the state's trusted agent, not horizontally among the Kurdish tribesmen. Furthermore, the Hamidiye's military identity was styled with clear Circassian influence; their uniforms included the *cherkeska* (Circassian coat) and they were armed with the *shashka* (Circassian sword), symbols of Caucasian martial prowess adopted to create a new, state-sanctioned warrior identity.[43]
The Hamidiye had a dual mandate. Officially, its purpose was to patrol the Russo-Ottoman frontier.[43] In practice, its primary functions were internal: to serve as a counterforce to the growing Armenian revolutionary movement and to control the Kurdish population itself by co-opting certain tribes into the state system.[43] Membership in the Hamidiye bestowed enormous advantages on the participating Kurdish tribes. They received modern weaponry, official state sanction, and, most consequentially, impunity for their actions.[43] Hamidiye tribes

were able to seize land, plunder villages, and dominate their non-Hamidiye Kurdish rivals and Armenian neighbors without fear of government reprisal.[45] This policy deliberately created an asymmetrical power balance, exacerbating inter-tribal violence within Kurdish society and making the Hamidiye a primary instrument in the state-sponsored Hamidian Massacres of Armenians in 1894-96 and the subsequent Armenian Genocide.[43] This state-sponsored empowerment of certain Kurdish tribes against others deepened the fractures within Kurdish society, making the emergence of a unified national consciousness more difficult. At the same time, by providing thousands of Kurdish tribesmen with military training, modern weapons, and experience in organized violence, the state inadvertently created a powerful cadre of fighters who, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of their patron Sultan, could redirect those skills toward new political ends, including Kurdish nationalism.[44]

2.4 Engineered Proximity: Circassian Settlements in Kurdistan

The Ottoman policy of strategic resettlement brought the two groups into direct, engineered proximity. Having initially been hesitant to settle refugees in the impoverished eastern provinces, the Ottoman government soon came to view the loyal Circassians as a useful tool to "diminish the Kurdish claim to the region" and dilute the homogeneity of both Kurdish and Armenian populations.[41]

Beginning in the 1860s, waves of Circassian refugees, such as those from the Shapsug tribe, were settled in Kurdish-majority districts like Ahlat, Adilcevaz, and Sarıkamış.[41] They were established in a variety of settings: some were moved into existing Kurdish villages, while others founded new settlements or occupied villages left abandoned by Armenians and Greeks.[41]

While this policy was intended to create a loyalist demographic bulwark, its long-term consequence was often the opposite of what the state intended. For small, displaced refugee communities surrounded by a large, rooted indigenous population, long-term survival often necessitated cultural integration. In the absence of sustained state support or a critical mass of their own people, many of these isolated Circassian and other Caucasian communities underwent a gradual process of "Kurdification".[41] Over generations, through daily interaction, intermarriage, and linguistic immersion, they assimilated into the dominant local culture, adopting the Kurdish language and, in many cases, a Kurdish identity. This reveals a fundamental flaw in the Ottoman strategy: while the state could engineer physical proximity, it could not always control the cultural outcomes. The relationship that emerged in these specific locales was therefore not one of sustained conflict or alliance, but of the cultural absorption of a smaller diaspora by a larger indigenous group.

Table 2: Timeline of Key Events in Kurdish-Circassian-Ottoman Relations (1860-1923)

Date(s)	Key Event	Significance for Kurdish-Circassian Relations
1860-1867	Circassian Genocide & Mass Exile to Ottoman Empire [22]	Catalyst for bringing Circassians into Ottoman

		lands, setting the stage for their strategic resettlement.
1862	First Circassian settlements in Kurdish areas (Ahlat, Adilcevaz) [41]	Marks the beginning of state-engineered proximity, with the goal of diluting Kurdish demographic dominance.
Mid-19th C.	Intensification of Ottoman Centralization Policies (*Tanzimat*) [34]	Leads to the dismantling of autonomous Kurdish emirates, provoking a series of Kurdish tribal revolts.
1877-1878	Russo-Turkish War	Results in further Ottoman territorial losses in the Balkans and a new wave of Circassian refugees to Anatolia and Syria.[16]
1880	Sheikh Ubeydullah's Revolt [33]	A major Kurdish uprising against Ottoman and Persian centralization, framed by some in early nationalist terms.
1891	Establishment of the Hamidiye Cavalry [43]	A pivotal moment institutionalizing a state-mediated relationship: Kurdish tribesmen serving under a command structure with Circassian influence, used to suppress Armenians and control other Kurds.
1894-1896	Hamidian Massacres [43]	Hamidiye regiments, composed mainly of Kurds, are primary perpetrators of mass violence against Armenians, deepening ethnic tensions.
1908	Young Turk Revolution [49]	Rise of Turkish nationalism. Circassian elites are well-integrated into the new CUP regime [35], while Kurdish nationalism begins to grow in reaction to Turkification policies.[42]
1914-1918	World War I and the Armenian Genocide [33]	Ottoman Kurdistan becomes a major battlefield. Some Kurdish

		tribes participate in the genocide, while Circassian elites largely remain loyal to the Ottoman war effort.[33]
1920	Treaty of Sèvres [49]	Promises the possibility of an autonomous, and potentially independent, Kurdish state, a promise that galvanizes Kurdish aspirations.
1923	Treaty of Lausanne [49]	Replaces Sèvres, establishes the borders of the modern Turkish Republic, and makes no mention of Kurdistan, effectively ending international support for Kurdish statehood.

Section 3: Navigating New Borders: Kurds and Circassians in the Post-Ottoman Middle East

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the drawing of new national borders by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 set the Kurdish and Circassian peoples on starkly divergent paths. Their respective positions within the late Ottoman order—the Kurds as a large, restive indigenous population on the periphery, and the Circassians as a smaller, geographically dispersed diaspora with an elite integrated into the state's core—directly shaped their experiences and political strategies in the new successor states, particularly the Turkish Republic and Syria.

3.1 The Turkish Republic: A Tale of Two Minorities

The foundational ideology of the Turkish Republic was a monolithic, secular Turkish nationalism that sought to create a homogenous nation-state from the diverse Muslim populations of the former empire.[51] This project had profoundly different implications for Kurds and Circassians.

3.1.1 The Kurdish Experience: Resistance and the Struggle for Identity

For the Kurds, the new republic represented a catastrophic loss of the autonomy they had enjoyed, even intermittently, under the Ottomans, and the erasure of the national rights

promised at Sèvres.[49] The Kemalist state embarked on a decades-long policy of aggressive, forced assimilation. The very existence of a separate Kurdish identity was denied; they were officially designated "Mountain Turks".[2] The Kurdish language was banned from public life, education, and media; Kurdish place names were changed to Turkish ones; and even the words "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" were forbidden.[3]

This policy of cultural annihilation was met with immediate and sustained resistance. The early republican era was marked by a series of major Kurdish rebellions, including those led by Sheikh Said (1925) and the Dersim uprising (1937), all of which were suppressed with extreme brutality by the Turkish military.[52] After a period of relative quiet, the conflict reignited in a modern form with the founding of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 1978 and the launch of its armed insurgency in 1984.[56] This conflict has lasted for over four decades, claiming tens of thousands of lives and resulting in the destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages and the forced displacement of millions.[57] In parallel with the armed struggle, a powerful, legal Kurdish Political Movement has persisted, establishing a succession of pro-Kurdish political parties (such as the HEP, HDP, and currently the DEM Party) to advocate for cultural rights, democratic reforms, and regional autonomy through parliamentary means, despite facing constant state repression, including party closures and the imprisonment of elected officials.[60]

3.1.2 The Circassian Experience: Loyalty and the Politics of Memory

The Circassian experience within the Turkish Republic stands in sharp contrast. Having been deeply integrated into the late Ottoman military and bureaucracy, many Circassian elites played a significant role in the Turkish War of Independence, fighting alongside the Kemalist forces.[35] Although they were also subjected to the state's Turkification policies—including the prohibition of their language in schools and the changing of their village names—their collective response was not rebellion.[63] Instead, they pursued a strategy of quiet cultural preservation while demonstrating unwavering loyalty to the Turkish state. This has led to a common stereotype, held by both Turks and some Circassians themselves, that they are "more Turkish than the Turks".[35]

Modern Circassian political activism in Turkey is not separatist or irredentist; it operates entirely within the framework of the Turkish state.[66] The primary goals of Circassian organizations are twofold. First, they advocate for cultural and linguistic rights, such as mother-tongue education in public schools and dedicated state-funded radio and television broadcasts.[64] Second, and most centrally, they campaign for international recognition of the 1864 Russian-perpetrated genocide.[64] Their political strategy is pragmatic, involving lobbying and placing candidates within a spectrum of mainstream Turkish political parties, from the ruling AKP to the nationalist MHP and the secularist CHP, rather than forming a singular, confrontational ethnic political bloc.[66]

3.1.3 A Rejected Alliance: Different Struggles, Different Goals

The divergent political paths of the two communities have made any potential "minority alliance" untenable. Pro-Kurdish political parties, in their efforts to build a broader democratic coalition, have at times courted the Circassian community.[66] However, these overtures have been consistently rejected by mainstream Circassian organizations. The reasons for this rejection are rooted in their fundamentally different historical positions and political goals. First, the deep integration of Circassians into the Turkish state, particularly its security and military apparatus, places them in direct opposition to the Kurdish insurgency. Many Circassians have served in the very institutions fighting the PKK.[66] Second, there is a strong desire within the Circassian community to avoid association with the PKK, which is officially designated a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies. They believe that such an alliance would jeopardize their relationship with the state and undermine their ability to achieve their own goals.[66]

Ultimately, their political demands are aimed at different targets and seek different outcomes. The Kurdish movement's demands for autonomy and self-determination represent a fundamental challenge to the unitary structure of the Turkish state.[61] The Circassian movement's demands are for cultural accommodation *from* the Turkish state and historical justice *from* a foreign power, Russia.[67] Their political identities are thus defined not in relation to each other, but almost entirely by their contrasting relationships with the Turkish state. This dynamic is perfectly encapsulated by the question of a former Turkish MP of Circassian origin: "How could the Kurds not accept being Turkish when I, as a Circassian, did?".[54] The reference point is not a shared minority experience, but a differing response to the hegemonic national project.

3.2 Syria: Parallel Histories in a Volatile State

In Syria, the Kurds and Circassians also followed largely separate trajectories, shaped by their distinct settlement patterns and relationships with the central government.

Kurdish Presence: Kurds have an ancient presence in Syria, with notable communities established in Damascus and Aleppo during the reign of the Kurdish Ayyubid dynasty in the 12th century.[68] Their population in the northern Jazira region grew significantly in the 1920s with the arrival of refugees fleeing persecution in Kemalist Turkey.[68] Under the pan-Arab nationalist Ba'athist regime, Syrian Kurds faced severe discrimination, including the stripping of citizenship from tens of thousands, making them stateless (*ajanib*), and the suppression of their language and culture.[69] The chaos of the Syrian Civil War (2011-present) created a power vacuum that allowed the dominant Kurdish political force, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its armed wing, the YPG, to establish a de facto autonomous administration in the northeast, known as Rojava or the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).[69]

Circassian Presence: Circassians were settled by the Ottoman authorities in the late 19th century, primarily in the Golan Heights and around Homs and Damascus.[18] They were often used as a loyal militia to establish state control and act as a buffer against powerful Bedouin and Druze communities.[72] They became a founding population in cities like Quneitra.[18] Their community was shattered by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when Israel captured the Golan Heights, forcing the majority of the Circassian population to flee and become internally displaced persons, mostly in Damascus.[72] The Syrian Civil War brought a second wave of devastation and displacement, with many Circassian villages destroyed and a large portion of the community fleeing as refugees to Turkey, Jordan, or their ancestral homeland in the Caucasus.[74]

Interaction: As in the Ottoman period, the two groups in Syria have existed more in parallel than in direct, sustained relation. The historical record does note one significant point of interaction: during the Armenian and Assyrian Genocides in the final years of the Ottoman Empire, some Kurdish, Circassian, and Chechen tribes cooperated with Ottoman authorities in persecuting Christian minorities in Upper Mesopotamia.[68] However, for most of their history in modern Syria, their communities have been geographically and politically separate, each navigating its own complex relationship with the central state.

Section 4: The Soviet Experiment: Divided Homelands and Divergent Fates

The policies of the Soviet Union towards its Caucasian and Kurdish minorities provide another powerful example of how external statecraft shaped the destinies of these two peoples. While operating under a different ideology, the Soviet state, much like the Ottoman and Turkish states, employed strategies of division and control that had profoundly different long-term consequences for Circassians and Kurds.

4.1 The Circassian Homeland: Administrative Division

In the early years of the Soviet Union, the policy of *korenizatsiya* ("indigenization") officially promoted the development of national languages and cultures for the USSR's many ethnic groups.[31] For the Circassians who remained in their homeland after the 1864 genocide, this policy was implemented through a classic "divide and rule" strategy.[16]

The Soviet government officially rejected the notion of a single, unified Circassian (Adyghe) people. Instead, it decreed that they were three separate ethnic groups: the Cherkes, the Adyghe, and the Kabardinians.[31] Based on this artificial division, their historical homeland was partitioned into three distinct autonomous administrative units within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR): the Adygeya Autonomous Oblast (for the "Adyghe"), the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (for the "Cherkes," whom they shared with the

Turkic Karachays), and the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Oblast (for the "Kabardinians," shared with the Turkic Balkars).[17] This administrative fragmentation was designed to prevent the emergence of a unified Circassian political entity that could challenge Moscow's authority, effectively institutionalizing their division within their own ancestral lands.[16]

4.2 The "Red Kurdistan" and Deportation

The Kurds of the Soviet Caucasus, whose population had grown in the 19th century through Russian imperial expansion and migration from the Ottoman Empire, also experienced the dual nature of Soviet nationality policy.[76] Initially, they too benefited from *korenizatsiya*. The 1920s saw a flourishing of Kurdish cultural institutions, including schools and newspapers, and the brief establishment of the Kurdistan Uyezd, or "Red Kurdistan," an administrative district in Soviet Azerbaijan between 1923 and 1929.[76]

This period of cultural autonomy was brutally cut short by the rise of Stalinism. The Soviet state came to view its Kurds, with their strong cross-border ties to communities in Turkey and Iran, as a politically suspect and potentially disloyal diaspora minority.[76] In 1937, and again on a larger scale in 1944, the NKVD carried out mass deportations. Thousands of Kurds were forcibly removed from their homes in the Caucasus republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan and exiled as "special settlers" to the remote regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.[76]

This policy of deportation had catastrophic long-term consequences. Unlike the Circassians, who, despite being politically fragmented, retained titular republics and a demographic foothold in their ancestral homeland, the Kurds were completely severed from their Caucasian roots. They became a dispersed diaspora *within* the Soviet Union, lacking any national territory or administrative recognition. Even after the de-Stalinization of 1956, when the "special settler" restrictions were lifted, the deported Kurds were forbidden from returning to their homes in the Caucasus.[76]

The comparison between the Soviet treatment of the two groups is revealing. Both the Ottoman/Turkish and Soviet states, despite their opposing ideologies, utilized similar logics of imperial control to manage their minority populations. However, the specific tactics they employed—fragmentation in situ for the Circassians versus outright deportation and dispersal for the Kurds—led to vastly different outcomes. The Soviet policy toward the Circassians, while divisive, inadvertently preserved a territorial base in the Caucasus that now serves as a political and cultural anchor for the global diaspora and their aspirations for repatriation.[15] In contrast, the policy of deportation effectively erased the Kurdish presence in the Soviet Caucasus, creating a "diaspora within a diaspora" and further complicating their already fragmented national identity and political organization.

Section 5: Global Diasporas and Contrasting Political Mobilizations

The global diasporas of the Kurdish and Circassian peoples are living legacies of their distinct historical traumas. Their political organizations, goals, and modes of mobilization reflect the core nature of their respective struggles: the Kurds as a massive, stateless nation fighting for political rights in an ongoing conflict, and the Circassians as a geographically scattered, post-genocide people fighting for cultural survival and historical memory.

5.1 The Kurdish Diaspora: A Political Engine for a Stateless Nation

The Kurdish diaspora, with major communities concentrated in Western Europe, particularly Germany, is fundamentally a political phenomenon.[4] It is a direct product of the political violence, oppression, and lack of opportunity in the four parts of Kurdistan. Consequently, the diaspora is highly organized and intensely politicized, serving as a crucial rear base for the political and military movements in the homeland.[77]

A vast and complex network of cultural centers, media outlets, and political associations exists across Europe and North America. These organizations are often aligned with or directly linked to the major political parties from the homeland, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) from Turkey, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) from Iraq, and others.[77] The primary focus of this mobilization is political. It involves lobbying Western governments for political support, raising awareness about human rights abuses, fundraising to support political activities and, in the case of groups like the PKK, armed struggle in the homeland, and organizing cultural events that reinforce a politicized national identity.[77] The Kurdish diaspora is, in essence, another front in the ongoing struggle for self-determination.

5.2 The Circassian Diaspora: A Cultural Network for a Dispersed People

The Circassian diaspora is older, more geographically dispersed, and numerically larger in total, with significant populations in Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and various Western countries.[17] Its organizational structure reflects a different set of priorities. The primary focus of diaspora organizations, coordinated globally by umbrella groups like the International Circassian Association (ICA), is on cultural preservation and the connecting of disparate communities.[80]

Their mobilization centers on saving their endangered languages from extinction, reviving and teaching the principles of the *Adyghe Xabze*, and fostering a shared sense of identity among communities separated by generations of exile.[80] While the dream of returning to an independent historical Circassia remains a powerful emotional and cultural touchstone, their immediate political activism is not focused on insurgency or separatism.[80] Instead, their

political energy is directed towards two main goals: securing cultural and linguistic rights within their host countries (such as language education in Turkey and Jordan) and, most importantly, achieving international recognition of the 1864 Russian-perpetrated genocide.[64]
The political orientations of the two diasporas are fundamentally different. The Kurdish diaspora is primarily *homeland-oriented*, with its activities inextricably linked to the active political and military struggles taking place in Kurdistan. Its purpose is to influence and support an ongoing battle for a political future. The Circassian diaspora, by contrast, is more *host-land and memory-oriented*. Its activities are focused on navigating life as a minority in the diaspora, preserving a culture nearly destroyed, and achieving justice for a historical crime that is now over 150 years in the past.
This fundamental difference in their definitions of "the problem" explains the near-total absence of joint political action or shared diaspora organizations. For Kurds, the problem is the contemporary political structure of the states of the Middle East. For Circassians, the problem is the historical legacy of Russian imperialism and the present-day threat of cultural assimilation. They are, in effect, fighting different battles on different fronts, making any broad collaboration on a shared "minority" platform strategically unappealing and largely irrelevant to their core objectives.

Section 6: Sociological Dimensions and Inter-Communal Perceptions

While the relationship between Kurds and Circassians has been overwhelmingly mediated by state actors, examining the limited instances of direct social interaction and the collective memories of each group reveals a nuanced and asymmetrical dynamic. The available sociological data, though sparse, points towards a relationship characterized more by assimilation and differing perceptions than by sustained cooperation or conflict.

6.1 Assimilation and "Kurdification"

One of the most significant, yet under-researched, forms of direct interaction between the two peoples was the assimilation of Circassian communities into Kurdish society. As detailed previously, the Ottoman policy of settling small groups of Circassian refugees in the midst of the vast, predominantly Kurdish-inhabited regions of eastern Anatolia had a profound and likely unintended consequence.[41] Isolated from other Circassian centers and lacking a critical demographic mass, many of these communities, over the course of generations, were culturally and linguistically absorbed by their Kurdish neighbors.[41] This process, which can be termed "Kurdification," involved the adoption of the Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish as their mother tongue, intermarriage with local Kurds, and the gradual erosion of a distinct Circassian identity.[41] This phenomenon represents a crucial aspect of their historical relationship,

demonstrating that in the absence of state intervention, the dynamic was one of cultural absorption by the larger, indigenous population rather than the creation of a permanent, distinct diaspora enclave in those specific areas.

6.2 Intermarriage and Social Boundaries

Specific statistical data on the rates of intermarriage between Kurds and Circassians is virtually nonexistent. Sociological and demographic studies on marriage patterns in Turkey tend to focus on the much larger dynamic of Turkish-Kurdish intermarriage or on the high rates of endogamy (marriage within the group) that characterize both communities.[83] Historically, strong social boundaries would have limited intermarriage. Circassian society, guided by the *Adyghe Xabze*, traditionally promotes endogamous marriage as a means of preserving their distinct and endangered culture.[28] Similarly, Kurdish society is highly endogamous, with marriage patterns often dictated by tribal, clan, and lineage affiliations.[8] Furthermore, studies note high rates of consanguineous marriage (cousin marriage) in many parts of the Middle East, including among rural Kurdish populations, which further reinforces in-group marriage patterns.[85] These cultural norms suggest that, outside of the specific contexts where "Kurdification" occurred, intermarriage between the two groups would have been the exception rather than the rule.

6.3 Oral Histories and Collective Memory

The collective memories of the two groups, as revealed through oral histories and the narratives of community activists, highlight a deeply asymmetrical relationship, particularly within the context of Turkey.

Circassian oral histories and intellectual discourse in Turkey reveal a complex and often conflicted relationship with the state. These narratives blend expressions of loyalty and successful integration into the Ottoman and Turkish elite with memories of the trauma of exile and the pain of state-enforced assimilation policies.[35] A recurring theme is the self-perception of being "guests" (*misafir*) in Turkey, a term that simultaneously conveys a sense of gratitude and loyalty to the "host" nation while also articulating a feeling of rootlessness and an enduring connection to a lost Caucasian homeland.[89]

Crucially, in the Turkish context, the Kurdish people loom large as a significant "other" in the Circassian collective consciousness. Circassian activists and intellectuals frequently define their community's political position in direct contrast to that of the Kurds.[35] They frame their history of loyalty to the state as a deliberate and virtuous alternative to the Kurdish history of rebellion. This rhetorical positioning serves to construct a Circassian identity as a "docile" or "model" minority, thereby differentiating themselves from the politically contentious Kurds and reinforcing their own distinct relationship with the state.[88]

In stark contrast, there is little evidence in the available sources to suggest that Circassians occupy a significant place in Kurdish collective memory or political discourse. The focus of Kurdish oral history and political narratives is overwhelmingly on their relationship with the dominant state powers—Turkish, Arab, and Persian—and on the internal dynamics of their national liberation struggle, including the role of the PKK, tribal leaders, and political parties.[52] This reveals the asymmetrical nature of their sociological relationship. For the Circassian minority in Turkey, the "Kurdish question" is the defining political issue for all non-Turkish groups, and their own identity and strategy are shaped in reaction to it. They must navigate a political landscape where the state's perception of them is colored by its conflict with the Kurds.[35] For the Kurds, who constitute a much larger minority engaged in a direct and existential conflict with the state, the Circassians are a smaller, less politically relevant group. The power dynamic ensures that the larger, more politically mobilized group (the Kurds) becomes a central point of reference for the smaller group (the Circassians), but the reverse is not true. This asymmetry is the ultimate sociological outcome of their divergent historical paths and their profoundly different relationships with state power.

Conclusion and Strategic Insights

The relationship between the Kurdish and Circassian peoples is a compelling case study in how inter-ethnic dynamics are forged not by intrinsic affinity or animosity, but by the powerful hand of external statecraft. Their histories are not those of two peoples in a sustained dialogue, but of two distinct nations being acted upon in different ways by the same imperial and post-imperial powers. The analysis reveals that their interactions have been episodic, indirect, and overwhelmingly mediated by the strategic interests of the Russian, Ottoman, and Turkish states.

A synthesis of the findings demonstrates that their divergent trajectories are the logical outcome of their foundational differences and contrasting historical experiences. The Kurds, an ancient, tribally organized people indigenous to a vast and strategically vital mountainous homeland, have historically engaged with central powers from a position of rootedness, leading to a long tradition of seeking autonomy and resisting assimilation. Their modern political struggle is for a future in their homeland, a fight for political rights, self-determination, and an end to statelessness. The Circassians, a people with a hierarchical, feudal tradition, were violently uprooted from their Caucasian homeland in a 19th-century genocide. As a displaced diaspora, their primary struggle has been with the memory of a homeland lost and the challenge of preserving their unique culture and language while integrating into new host societies. Their political mobilization is therefore focused on historical justice and cultural survival, not on challenging the sovereignty of the states in which they now reside.

This fundamental divergence explains the lack of a shared political consciousness or meaningful alliance between the two groups. In Turkey, where they coexist as the two largest Muslim minorities, their relationship with the state is oppositional. The Circassian elite's

historical integration into the state apparatus and the community's broader strategy of loyalty places them on the opposite side of the country's central political conflict from the Kurdish movement. The relationship is also sociologically asymmetrical: the Kurds serve as a crucial political reference point for Circassians, while Circassians are a minor factor in the Kurdish political calculus.

Implications for Policy and Research:

- **For Policymakers:** Any government or international body addressing minority rights in the Middle East, particularly in Turkey and Syria, must abandon a one-size-fits-all approach. The political goals, historical grievances, and strategic priorities of the Kurdish and Circassian communities are fundamentally different. Policies that might address Kurdish demands for political autonomy are irrelevant to Circassian goals of genocide recognition and cultural support. Conversely, cultural accommodations offered to Circassians do not address the core political and human rights issues at the heart of the Kurdish question. Effective policy requires distinct, tailored engagement with each community based on its unique history and aspirations.
- **For Researchers:** This analysis underscores the critical need for scholarship on inter-ethnic relations to incorporate the state as a primary analytical variable. The Kurdish-Circassian dynamic cannot be understood simply by studying the two groups in isolation; it is the policies of the state that created the conditions for their interaction and defined its nature. Further research is particularly needed in several areas. First, more granular, micro-level historical and ethnographic work is required to document the process of "Kurdification" in eastern Turkey, a significant but poorly understood outcome of Ottoman settlement policy. Second, comparative sociological studies on identity, intermarriage, and social boundaries in the diaspora are needed to move beyond anecdotal evidence. Finally, understanding this relationship provides a powerful lens through which to analyze the enduring legacies of empire, genocide, and nationalism in shaping the contemporary political landscape of the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Works Cited

1. [1]: OLLI at George Mason University. (n.d.).
   Who Are the Kurds?
2. [2]: Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. (n.d.).
   Kurd. Encyclopædia Britannica.
3. [6]: Hennerbichler, F. (2012). The Origin of the Kurds.
   Advances in Anthropology, 2(2), 64-79.
4. [4]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
   Kurds.
5. [3]: Democratic Kurdish Community Center. (n.d.).
   Kurdistan.

6. [5]: Prim, F. (2024).
The Kurds, history, homeland, language and other facts.
7. [15]: Joshua Project. (n.d.).
Adyghe in Russia.
8. [19]: Circassian Heritage Center. (n.d.).
The Circassians in the Middle East.
9. [20]: Schiffman, H. (n.d.).
The Circassians. University of Pennsylvania.
10. [16]: TRT World. (2020).
7 things to know about the Circassians.
11. [17]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassians.
12. [31]: Zhemukhov, S. (2016).
Circassian Nationalism. 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
13. [7]: Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. (n.d.).
Kurd. Encyclopædia Britannica.
14. [8]: eHRAF World Cultures. (n.d.).
Kurds: Summary. Yale University.
15. [9]: van Bruinessen, M. (1994). The Kurdish Experience.
Middle East Report, (189), 2-7.
16. [90]: Cultural Orientation Resource Center. (n.d.).
Iraqi Kurds Culture Profile.
17. [32]: Kurdish Institute of Paris. (n.d.).
The Kurdish people.
18. [23]: Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. (n.d.).
Circassian. Encyclopædia Britannica.
19. [24]: Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. (n.d.).
Circassian. Encyclopædia Britannica.
20. [25]: International Centre for Circassian Studies. (n.d.).
Kabardian Class System.
21. [26]: Cherkasov, A. A., et al. (2018). The Circassian Aristocracy in the late XVIII – the first half of XIX centuries: the Social Structure of Society.
Bylye Gody, 47(1), 88-96.
22. [37]: Fiveable. (n.d.).
Circassians.
23. [91]: Aheku. (n.d.).
Circassians in history.
24. [11]: Farrokh, K. (n.d.).
Professor B. A. Litvinsky: Helmets of Partho-Sassanian Iran.
25. [12]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).

Kurdish tribes.
26. [13]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Category:Kurdish tribes.
27. [14]: van Bruinessen, M. (2002).
Kurds, states, and tribes. Utrecht University.
28. [92]: Reddit. (2023).
List of Kurdish tribes that were Ezidi according to tribal registers of three 13th-century manuscripts. r/kurdistan.
29. [18]: Meiqari, D. (2019).
The Circassian Heritage in Syria within the Context of Multiple Displacements. The Aleppo Project.
30. [93]: Riehl, C. M. (2018). The Caucasian diaspora in Jordan.
The Mouth, (6).
31. [80]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassian nationalism.
32. [94]: Siver, A. V. (2017). The Role of Kinship in the Social and Political Organization of the Kabardian Early State.
Social Evolution & History, 16(2), 104-123.
33. [21]: Sharifzadeh, A. (2014).
Circassia: A Land without a People. Borderless Blogger.
34. [95]: Hessel, P. (2020).
Circassian Beauties. The Public Domain Review.
35. [27]: Bram, S. A. (n.d.).
The Circassians in Israel. The National Library of Israel.
36. [96]: YouTube. (n.d.).
Adyghe Language (Adygabze).
37. [28]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Adyghe Xabze.
38. [29]: DBpedia. (n.d.).
Adyghe Xabze.
39. [97]: Reddit. (2023).
What specifically does Xabze include? r/AskCaucasus.
40. [30]: Voices Skopje. (2024).
Who are Circassians?
41. [35]: Doğan, S. N. (2024). No Matter How Close It Is: Circassian Relationships with the State Apparatus in Turkey.
Alternatif Politika, 16(1), 74-95.
42. [49]: Soka University of America. (n.d.).
Turkish Nationalism, the Kurdish Fight for Freedom, and the Western Quest for Peace.
43. [36]: Gingeras, R. (2011). A Movable Empire: The Role of the North Caucasian Diaspora in the Politics of the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic, 1914-1923.

European Journal of Turkish Studies, (12).
44. [33]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Ottoman Kurds.
45. [38]: Hamed-Troyansky, V. (2024).
Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman State. Stanford University Press.
46. [50]: Eppel, M. (2021). The Kurdish Movement and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1880–1923. In
The Cambridge History of the Kurds. Cambridge University Press.
47. [43]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Hamidiye (cavalry).
48. [45]: Wikiwand. (n.d.).
Hamidiye (cavalry).
49. [48]: Çakmak, Y., & Şur, T. (2022). Margins of Allegiance and Revolt: Relations between Kurdish Tribes and the State from the Late Ottoman Period to the Early Modern Republic.
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 16, 1-15.
50. [47]: Klein, J. (2011).
The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone. Stanford University Press.
51. [44]: History of Kurd. (2017).
Hamidiye Cavalry.
52. [46]: Review of
The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone by Janet Klein. (n.d.). ResearchGate.
53. [35]: Doğan, S. N. (2024). No Matter How Close It Is: Circassian Relationships with the State Apparatus in Turkey.
Alternatif Politika, 16(1), 74-95.
54. [42]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurdish–Turkish relations.
55. [98]: Duman, Ö. (2017). Ottomans in the Caucasian Highlands: Recruitment of the Circassians and the Ottoman Mission in Anapa, 1812–1828.
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 49(3), 443-465.
56. [99]: Eppel, M. (2014). "Our Rumelia": The Young Turks and the Question of the Ottoman Balkans, 1878-1913.
Journal of the Center for Ottoman Studies, (5), 1-22.
57. [38]: Hamed-Troyansky, V. (2024).
Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman State. Stanford University Press.
58. [41]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurdification.

59. [100]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassians in Turkey.
60. [39]: Shami, S. (1990). The Social Implications of the Settlement of the Circassians in Jordan.
Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan, 4, 417-421.
61. [17]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassians.
62. [101]: TRT World. (2024).
The Circassian exile: 9 facts about the tragedy.
63. [102]: The Jordan Times. (2021).
Refugees and founders: Studying the legacy of Circassians and Chechens in Jordan's history.
64. [103]: Unat, F. R. (n.d.).
Immigration and Settlement of Circassians in the Ottoman Empire.
65. [34]: Sonmez, S. (2016). The Rebellions of the Kurdish Tribes in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire.
Journal of History and Future, 2(2), 1-13.
66. [50]: Eppel, M. (2021). The Kurdish Movement and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1880–1923. In
The Cambridge History of the Kurds. Cambridge University Press.
67. [54]: The Jerusalem Post. (2024).
Turkey's axis of evil and the Kurdish struggle for independence.
68. [22]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassian genocide.
69. [36]: Gingeras, R. (2011). A Movable Empire: The Role of the North Caucasian Diaspora in the Politics of the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic, 1914-1923.
European Journal of Turkish Studies, (12).
70. [10]: Erol, M. (2018). Kurdish Territoriality under Ottoman Rule. In
Mapping Kurdistan: Territory, Self-Determination and Nationalism. Cambridge University Press.
71. [35]: Doğan, S. N. (2024). No Matter How Close It Is: Circassian Relationships with the State Apparatus in Turkey.
Alternatif Politika, 16(1), 74-95.
72. [41]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurdification.
73. [42]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurdish–Turkish relations.
74. [66]: Goble, P. (2015). Turkish Circassians Reject Proffered Alliance With Kurds.
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12(64).
75. [57]: POMEPS. (2021).
Erasure and Affect in Race-Making in Turkey.

76. [68]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurds in Syria.
77. [104]: Kurmel, Ö. A. (2024).
Post-Assad Era and the Circassians. Abkhaz World.
78. [72]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassians in Syria.
79. [73]: Minority Rights Group International. (n.d.).
Syria.
80. [69]: Next Century Foundation. (n.d.).
Between History and Conflict: The Religious and Ethnic Groups of Syria.
81. [40]: Rozanova, M. S., & Kumpolova, S. V. (2017). The Circassian (Adyghe) diaspora: The problem of politicization.
Man in India, 97(22), 187-196.
82. [31]: Zhemukhov, S. (2016).
Circassian Nationalism. 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
83. [76]: Abernathy, D. (2014). The Deportation of the Soviet Kurds in 1937 and 1944.
Kurdish Studies, 2(2), 1-18.
84. [17]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassians.
85. [24]: Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. (n.d.).
Circassian. Encyclopædia Britannica.
86. [22]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassian genocide.
87. [80]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassian nationalism.
88. [63]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassian diaspora.
89. [74]: Akdeniz-Göker, E. (2022). Gendered Experiences of the Syrian Circassian Diaspora in Turkey.
Journal of Alternative Turkish Studies, 4(1), 1-20.
90. [77]: Allsopp, H. (2021). The Political Mobilisation of the Kurdish Internal Diaspora in Turkey. In
The Kurdish Issue in Turkey. Brill.
91. [67]: Toksabay, B. (2010).
Conflict Over Language Rights: The Positions of Kurds and Circassians in Turkey.
92. [36]: Gingeras, R. (2011). A Movable Empire: The Role of the North Caucasian Diaspora in the Politics of the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic, 1914-1923.
European Journal of Turkish Studies, (12).
93. [48]: Çakmak, Y., & Şur, T. (2022). Margins of Allegiance and Revolt: Relations between Kurdish Tribes and the State from the Late Ottoman Period to the Early Modern

Republic.
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 16, 1-15.
94. [105]: Somer, M. (2004). Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications.
Middle East Journal, 58(2), 235-253.
95. [106]: Kaya, A. (2015). Cultural reification in Circassian diaspora: Stereotypes, prejudices, and ethnic relations.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(1), 129-149.
96. [107]: Bifolchi, G. (2019). The Fate of the Circassian Community in Iraq between the Struggle for Survival and Formal Recognition.
IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 24(2), 83-87.
97. [108]: Acar, Y. G., et al. (2025). Studying Kurdishness in Turkey: A review of existing research.
British Journal of Social Psychology, 64(1), e12842.
98. [53]: Casier, M. (2016).
Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Then and Now. Foreign Policy Research Institute.
99. [58]: Eser, O., et al. (2024). The Representation of Kurds in Turkish Psychology: A Thematic Analysis of Graduate Theses.
Discourse Unit.
100. [87]: Oral, Y. (2023). Language Maintenance and Shift in the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey.
Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development.
101. [62]: Yelbasi, C. (2021).
The Circassians of Turkey: War, Violence and Nationalism from the Ottomans to Atatürk. I.B. Tauris.
102. [65]: Reddit. (2023).
The problem with Turks mentioning the Laz and Circassians. r/kurdistan.
103. [49]: Soka University of America. (n.d.).
Turkish Nationalism, the Kurdish Fight for Freedom, and the Western Quest for Peace.
104. [56]: Council on Foreign Relations. (2025).
Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups. Global Conflict Tracker.
105. [64]: Nordic Monitor. (2023).
Turkey hosted the first-ever independent Circassian event, a move that will unsettle Russia.
106. [60]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurdish Political Movement in Turkey.
107. [55]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurdish–Turkish conflict.
108. [52]: Democratic Kurdish Community Center. (2023).
The Kurdish Dilemma in Turkey.
109. [61]: OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. (2024).

The Kurds in Turkey: Waiting for a turning point.

110. [51]: CSIS. (2017).
The Kurdish Movement: Politicians and Fighters.

111. [63]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Circassian diaspora.

112. [109]: Gingeras, R. (2011).
A Movable Empire: The Role of the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923. Naval Postgraduate School.

113. [104]: Kurmel, Ö. A. (2024).
Is this the end of the road for Circassians in Syria? Abkhaz World.

114. [4]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Kurds.

115. [110]: Akdeniz-Göker, E. (2022). Gendered Experiences of the Syrian Circassian Diaspora in Turkey.
Journal of Alternative Turkish Studies, 4(1), 1-20.

116. [106]: Kaya, A. (2015). Cultural reification in Circassian diaspora: Stereotypes, prejudices, and ethnic relations.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(1), 129-149.

117. [111]: Syrian Democratic Times. (2025).
United Kurdish Delegation Heads to Damascus Amid Progress in Syria Talks.

118. [71]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

119. [78]: Rudaw. (2024).
EU lawmakers express solidarity with Kurds.

120. [79]: Insight Turkey. (2018).
The Rise and Fall of the AK Party's Kurdish Peace Initiatives.

121. [59]: UK Government. (2023).
Country Policy and Information Note: Kurds, Turkey.

122. [70]: Revista Periferias. (2018).
A People's Existence by Resistance: The Kurds.

123. [83]: Reddit. (2023).
Statistics of intermarriage between Kurds and Turks. r/kurdistan.

124. [84]: Koç, İ., et al. (2008). Demographic Differentials and Demographic Integration of Turkish and Kurdish Populations in Turkey.
Population Research and Policy Review, 27(4), 447-457.

125. [85]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Cousin marriage in the Middle East.

126. [86]: Reddit. (2020).
Rate of marriage with first cousins per Turkish province. r/MapPorn.

127. [112]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).
Turkification.

128. [113]: Gunes, C. (2013). Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma. In *Multiculturalism in Turkey*.
129. [35]: Doğan, S. N. (2024). No Matter How Close It Is: Circassian Relationships with the State Apparatus in Turkey. *Alternatif Politika*, 16(1), 74-95.
130. [89]: Yıldız, A. (2007). The Past as a Resource for the Slave Descendants of Circassians in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, (37), 59-80.
131. [87]: Oral, Y. (2023). Language Maintenance and Shift in the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*.
132. [114]: Minority Rights Group International. (2024). *Recognizing the Rights of Minorities in Türkiye: Q&A with Dr. Yasemin Oral*.
133. [38]: Hamed-Troyansky, V. (2024). *Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman State*. Stanford University Press.
134. [88]: Kaya, A. (2018). The Construction of Turkey's Circassians as a Docile Minority. *Poligrafi*, 23(89/90), 235-256.
135. [67]: Toksabay, B. (2010). *Conflict Over Language Rights: The Positions of Kurds and Circassians in Turkey*.
136. [35]: Doğan, S. N. (2024). No Matter How Close It Is: Circassian Relationships with the State Apparatus in Turkey. *Alternatif Politika*, 16(1), 74-95.
137. [106]: Kaya, A. (2015). Cultural reification in Circassian diaspora: Stereotypes, prejudices, and ethnic relations. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(1), 129-149.
138. [48]: Çakmak, Y., & Şur, T. (2022). Margins of Allegiance and Revolt: Relations between Kurdish Tribes and the State from the Late Ottoman Period to the Early Modern Republic. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 16, 1-15.
139. [58]: Eser, O., et al. (2024). The Representation of Kurds in Turkish Psychology: A Thematic Analysis of Graduate Theses. *Discourse Unit*.
140. [110]: Akdeniz-Göker, E. (2022). Gendered Experiences of the Syrian Circassian Diaspora in Turkey. *Journal of Alternative Turkish Studies*, 4(1), 1-20.
141. [115]: Northeastern Illinois University. (n.d.). *Summer Institute in Kurdish Language and Culture*.
142. [116]: American Kurdish Committee. (n.d.). *Education Programs*.
143. [80]: Wikipedia. (n.d.).

Circassian nationalism.

144. [75]: Taştekin, F. (2024). *Is this the end of the road for Circassians in Syria?* Abkhaz World.
145. [82]: Topçu, S. (2021). The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey: language education and how grassroots initiatives can help. *Foundation for Endangered Languages XXV Annual Conference*.
146. [81]: Center for Circassian Studies. (n.d.). *About Us*.
147. [50]: Cambridge University Press. (n.d.). *The Kurdish Movement and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1880–1923*.
148. [43]: Wikipedia. (n.d.). *Hamidiye (cavalry)*.
149. [41]: Wikipedia. (n.d.). *Kurdification*.
150. [50]: Cambridge University Press. (n.d.). *The Kurdish Movement and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1880–1923*.
151. [40]: DergiPark. (n.d.). *Circassian-Kurdish Relations*.
152. [67]: Circassian World. (n.d.). *Conflict Over Language Rights*.
153. [41]: Wikipedia. (n.d.). *Kurdification*.
154. [117]: 1914-1918-online. (n.d.). *Circassian Nationalism*.
155. [40]: DergiPark. (n.d.). *Circassian-Kurdish Relations*.
156. [35]: DergiPark. (n.d.). *Circassian-Kurdish Relations*.
157. [41]: Wikipedia. (n.d.). *Kurdification*.
158. [117]: 1914-1918-online. (n.d.). *Circassian Nationalism*.
159. [118]: DergiPark. (n.d.). *Circassian-Kurdish Relations*.

Works cited

1. WHO ARE THE KURDS ?, accessed June 19, 2025, https://olli.gmu.edu/docstore/600docs/1403-651-2Who%20Are%20the%20Kurds.pdf
2. Kurd | Syria, Language, Map, Women, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, History, & Culture | Britannica, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kurd

3. KURDISTAN - Washington Kurdish Institute, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dckurd.org/kurdistan/
4. Kurds - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurds
5. The Kurds: Name, History, Homeland, Language and Other Facts - Fred Aprim, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.fredaprim.com/pdfs/2024/The%20Kurds,%20history,%20homeland,%20language%20and%20other%20facts.pdf
6. The Origin of Kurds - Scientific Research Publishing, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=19564
7. www.britannica.com, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kurd#:~:text=the%20modern%20era.-,Social%20organization,in%20the%20large%20urban%20areas.
8. Kurds - Summary - eHRAF World Cultures, accessed June 19, 2025, https://ehrafworldcultures.yale.edu/cultures/MA11/summary
9. The Kurdish Experience - MERIP, accessed June 19, 2025, https://merip.org/1994/07/the-kurdish-experience/
10. Kurdish Territoriality under Ottoman Rule (Chapter 1) - Mapping Kurdistan, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/mapping-kurdistan/kurdish-territoriality-under-ottoman-rule/C643A4B336DB71659E8A4185302BBD7A
11. Professor Pierre Oberling: The Kurdish Tribes - Dr. Kaveh Farrokh, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.kavehfarrokh.com/the-kurds/professor-b-a-litvinsky-helmets-of-partho-sassanian-iran-2/
12. Kurdish tribes - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_tribes
13. Category:Kurdish tribes - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Kurdish_tribes
14. Kurds, states, and tribes - DSpace, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/20379/bruinessen_02_kurdsstatestribes.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
15. Adyghe, West Circassian in Russia people group profile - Joshua Project, accessed June 19, 2025, https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/10161/RS
16. Seven things to know about the Circassians — and their struggle, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.trtworld.com/asia/7-things-to-know-about-the-circassians-362964
17. Circassians - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassians
18. THE CIRCASSIAN HERITAGE IN SYRIA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF MULTIPLE DISPLACEMENTS - The Aleppo Project, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.thealeppoproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/TheCircassianHeritageInSyriaWithinTheContextOfMultipleDisplacementsDimaMeiqari2019.pdf
19. The Circassians - המרכז למורשת הצ'רקסית, accessed June 19, 2025, https://chckk.org.il/english/
20. The History of Circassians - sas.upenn.edu, accessed June 19, 2025,

http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/540/handouts/ussr/circass.htm
21. Longing for Circassia–A Land Without Her People - borderlessblogger, accessed June 19, 2025, https://borderlessblogger.com/2014/12/10/circassia-a-land-without-a-people/
22. Circassian genocide - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassian_genocide
23. www.britannica.com, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Circassian#:~:text=In%20their%20traditional%20social%20organization,the%20Circassians%20are%20Sunni%20Muslims.
24. Circassian | History & Description - Britannica, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Circassian
25. Social Hierarchy in Eastern Circassia: The Kabardian Class System - ICCS, accessed June 19, 2025, http://iccs.synthasite.com/resources/Kabardian%20Class%20System.pdf
26. The Circassian Aristocracy in the late XVIII – the first half of XIX centuries: the Social Structure of Society - Eastern European, accessed June 19, 2025, https://eesiag.com/history/the-circassian-aristocracy-in-the-late-xviii-.html
27. The Circassians in Israel - Jewish Virtual Library, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-circassians-in-israel
28. Adyghe Xabze - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adyghe_Xabze
29. About: Adyghe Xabze - DBpedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dbpedia.org/page/Adyghe_Xabze
30. Who are Circassians? - VOICES, accessed June 19, 2025, https://voiceskopje.org/2024/07/15/who-are-circassians/
31. Circassian Nationalism - 1914-1918 Online, accessed June 19, 2025, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/circassian-nationalism/
32. KURDS | Washington Kurdish Institute, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dckurd.org/kurds/
33. Ottoman Kurds - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Kurds
34. Ottoman Reforms and Kurdish Reactions in the19th Century Di Sedsala XIXem de Reformên Osmanî û Reaksiyonên - DergiPark, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/416627
35. No Matter How Close: Relationships of the Circassians with the State Apparatus in Turkey - DergiPark, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/3690281
36. The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923, accessed June 19, 2025, https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4424
37. Circassians - (History of the Middle East – 1800 to Present) - Vocab, Definition, Explanations | Fiveable, accessed June 19, 2025, https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/history-middle-east-since-1800/circassians
38. Empire of Refugees: Introduction | Stanford University Press, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.sup.org/books/middle-east-studies/empire-refugees/excerpt/introdu

ction
39. 19th Century Circassian Settlements in Jordan - DoA Publication, accessed June 19, 2025, https://publication.doa.gov.jo/uploads/publications/19/SHAJ_4-417-421.pdf
40. 08.Kasbolat F. DZAMIKHOV - DergiPark, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/2242383
41. Kurdification - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdification
42. Kurdish–Turkish relations - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish%E2%80%93Turkish_relations
43. Hamidiye (cavalry) - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamidiye_(cavalry)
44. Hamidiye Cavalry - History Of Kurdistan, accessed June 19, 2025, https://historyofkurd.com/english/2017/08/21/hamidiye-cavalry/
45. Hamidiye (cavalry) - Wikiwand, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/Hamidiye_(cavalry)
46. The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone by JANET KLEIN, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262095885_The_Margins_of_Empire_Kurdish_Militias_in_the_Ottoman_Tribal_Zone_by_JANET_KLEIN
47. The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone - Amazon.com, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.amazon.com/Margins-Empire-Kurdish-Militias-Ottoman/dp/0804775702
48. Relations between Kurdish Tribes and the State from the Late Ottoman Period to the Early Modern, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/download/5952/5541/27538
49. TURKISH NATIONALISM, THE KURDISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM, AND THE COMPLICATIONS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT: IS RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE? by Katherine Bennett '21 - Soka University, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.soka.edu/about/20th-anniversary-anthology/pacifism/turkish-nationalism-kurdish-fight-freedom-and
50. The Kurdish Movement and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1880 ..., accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-history-of-the-kurds/kurdish-movement-and-the-end-of-the-ottoman-empire-18801923/56AC07ABF6BDAF208E309EE76B871317
51. The Kurdish Movement: Politicians and Fighters - CSIS, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/kurdish-movement-politicians-and-fighters
52. The Kurdish Dilemma in Turkey | Washington Kurdish Institute, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dckurd.org/2023/01/26/the-kurdish-dilemma-in-turkey-2/
53. Turkey's “Kurdish Problem” - Then and Now - Foreign Policy Research Institute, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/01/turkeys-kurdish-problem-then-and-now/
54. How Turkey's founding ideology shaped its oppression of Kurds and minorities –

opinion - The Jerusalem Post, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-838409
55. Kurdish–Turkish conflict - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish%E2%80%93Turkish_conflict
56. Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups | Global Conflict Tracker - Council on Foreign Relations, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups
57. Erasure and Affect in Race-Making in Turkey - Project on Middle East Political Science, accessed June 19, 2025, https://pomeps.org/erasure-and-affect-in-race-making-in-turkey
58. How are the Kurds problematized and addressed by psychology theses in Turkey? A thematic analysis - Discourse Unit, accessed June 19, 2025, https://discourseunit.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/0869_eser_et_al.pdf
59. Country policy and information note: Kurds, Turkey, October 2023 (accessible) - GOV.UK, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/turkey-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-kurds-turkey-october-2023-accessible
60. Kurdish Political Movement in Turkey - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_Political_Movement_in_Turkey
61. The Kurds in Turkey – waiting for a turning point | OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2024-11-27/kurds-turkey-waiting-a-turning-point
62. The Circassians of Turkey: War, Violence and Nationalism from the Ottomans to Atatürk, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/circassians-of-turkey-9780755643677/
63. Circassian diaspora - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassian_diaspora
64. Turkey hosted the first-ever independent Circassian event, a move that will unsettle Russia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/08/turkey-hosted-the-first-ever-independent-circassian-event-a-move-that-will-unsettle-russia/
65. The problem with Turks mentioning the Laz and Circassians to discredit the Kurdish movement : r/kurdistan - Reddit, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/kurdistan/comments/1ip9jyn/the_problem_with_turks_mentioning_the_laz_and/
66. Turkish Circassians Reject Proffered Alliance With Kurds - Jamestown, accessed June 19, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-circassians-reject-proffered-alliance-with-kurds/
67. CONFLICT OVER LANGUAGE RIGHTS: THE CASE OF KURDS AND CIRCASSIANS IN TURKEY by BURCU TOKSABAY, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.circassianworld.com/pdf/toksabayb.pdf

68. Kurds in Syria - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurds_in_Syria
69. Between History and Conflict: The Religious and Ethnic Groups of Syria, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.nextcenturyfoundation.org/between-history-and-conflict-the-religious-and-ethnic-groups-of-syria/
70. A People's Existence by Resistance: The Kurds - Revista Periferias, accessed June 19, 2025, https://revistaperiferias.org/en/materia/a-peoples-existence-by-resistance-the-kurds/
71. Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Autonomous_Administration_of_North_and_East_Syria
72. Circassians in Syria - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassians_in_Syria
73. Syria - Minority Rights Group, accessed June 19, 2025, https://minorityrights.org/country/syria/
74. Changing Borders and Women as the Narrator: The Case of Syrian Circassians, accessed June 19, 2025, https://iccsor.com/index.php/jatss/article/view/212
75. Is This the End of the Road for Circassians in Syria? By Fehim Tastekin - AbkhazWorld, accessed June 19, 2025, https://abkhazworld.com/aw/analysis/2931-is-this-the-end-of-the-road-for-circassians-in-syria-by-fehim-tastekin
76. Kurds in the USSR, 1917-1956 - Kurdish Studies, accessed June 19, 2025, https://kurdishstudies.net/menu-script/index.php/KS/article/download/153/142/143
77. Radical Political Participation and the Internal Kurdish Diaspora in Turkey in - Brill, accessed June 19, 2025, https://brill.com/edcollchap-oa/book/9789004706590/BP000008.xml
78. EU lawmakers express solidarity with Kurds | Rudaw.net, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.rudaw.net/english/world/16112024
79. Rise and Fall of the AK Party's Kurdish Peace Initiatives, Articles Talha Köse | Insight Turkey, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/rise-and-fall-of-the-ak-partys-kurdish-peace-initiatives
80. Circassian nationalism - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassian_nationalism
81. About Us – Center for Circassian Studies - Çerkes Araştırmaları Merkezi, accessed June 19, 2025, https://circassianstudies.org/en/about-us/
82. (PDF) The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey: language education and how grassroots initiatives can help - ResearchGate, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358191656_The_Circassian_Diaspora_in_Turkey_language_education_and_how_grassroots_initiatives_can_help
83. Statistics of intermarriage between Kurds and Turks : r/kurdistan - Reddit,

accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/kurdistan/comments/1gsmxks/statistics_of_intermarriage_between_kurds_and/
84. (PDF) Demographic Differentials and Demographic Integration of Turkish and Kurdish Populations in Turkey - ResearchGate, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5153769_Demographic_Differentials_and_Demographic_Integration_of_Turkish_and_Kurdish_Populations_in_Turkey
85. Cousin marriage in the Middle East - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cousin_marriage_in_the_Middle_East
86. Rate of Marriage with First Cousins per Turkish Region in 2019(the region placement is really weird, I dunno why, never seen it like this before) : r/MapPorn - Reddit, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/hiny8f/rate_of_marriage_with_first_cousins_per_turkish/
87. Language Policies and Minority Language Maintenance: The Case of Circassian in Turkey - DergiPark, accessed June 19, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/3200749
88. THE CONSTRUCTION OF TURKEY'S CIRCASSIANS AS A DOCILE MINORITY, accessed June 19, 2025, https://ojs.zrs-kp.si/index.php/poligrafi/article/download/276/365/2876
89. (PDF) The Past as a Resource for the Slave Descendants of Circassians in Turkey, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339709198_The_Past_as_a_Resource_for_the_Slave_Descendants_of_Circassians_in_Turkey
90. Iraqi Kurds - Cultural Orientation Resource Center, accessed June 19, 2025, http://www.culturalorientation.net/content/download/2109/12162/version/1/file/Iraqi+Kurds+Culture+Profile.pdf
91. Circassians in history - Адыгэ Хэку, accessed June 19, 2025, https://aheku.net/articles/english/history/1065
92. List of Kurdish tribes that were Ezidi according to tribal registers of three 13th-century manuscripts : r/kurdistan - Reddit, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/kurdistan/comments/14mgb7k/list_of_kurdish_tribes_that_were_ezidi_according/
93. Far beyond the Caucasus – A trip to the Circassians and Chechens in Jordan, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.kaukasiologie.uni-jena.de/410/issue-6
94. Kinship and Territorial Ties within the Power System of the Traditional Kabardian Society - Articles from journals, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles/2914780/
95. Circassian Beauty in the American Sideshow - The Public Domain Review, accessed June 19, 2025, https://publicdomainreview.org/essay/circassian-beauties/
96. ADYGHE (WEST CIRCASSIAN) LANGUAGE, PEOPLE, & CULTURE - YouTube, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTFdvW_OFsw
97. What specifically does Xabze include? : r/AskCaucasus - Reddit, accessed June 19, 2025,

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskCaucasus/comments/10nr5sc/what_specifically_does_xabze_include/
98. Ottomans in the Caucasian Highlands: Recruitment of the Circassians and the Ottoman Mission in Anapa, 1812–1828 | International Journal of Middle East Studies - Cambridge University Press, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/ottomans-in-the-caucasian-highlands-recruitment-of-the-circassians-and-the-ottoman-mission-in-anapa-18121828/8566D3CED949FE2ED8783339089DF0C0
99. The Kurdish movement and the end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans (1878 to 1913) - BearWorks - Missouri State University, accessed June 19, 2025, https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1464&context=articles-chpa
100. Circassians in Turkey - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassians_in_Turkey
101. The Circassian exile: 9 facts about the tragedy - TRT Global, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.trtworld.com/europe/the-circassian-exile-9-facts-about-the-tragedy-12709135
102. From Refugees to Founders: studying legacy of Circassians, Chechens in Jordan's history, accessed June 19, 2025, https://jordantimes.com/news/local/refugees-founders-studying-legacy-circassians-chechens-jordans-history
103. Immigration and settlement of circassians in the ottoman empire on british documents 1857-1864 - SciSpace, accessed June 19, 2025, https://scispace.com/pdf/immigration-and-settlement-of-circassians-in-the-ottoman-2qcpdf20qf.pdf
104. Post-Assad Era and the Circassians, by Omer Aytek Kurmel - AbkhazWorld, accessed June 19, 2025, https://abkhazworld.com/aw/diaspora/2917-post-assad-era-and-the-circassians-by-omer-aytek-kurmel
105. Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications - Koç University, accessed June 19, 2025, https://mysite.ku.edu.tr/musomer/wp-content/uploads/sites/191/2021/07/Somer-MEJ-2004.pdf
106. Cultural reification in Circassian diaspora: Stereotypes, prejudices and ethnic relations | Request PDF - ResearchGate, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248979244_Cultural_reification_in_Circassian_diaspora_Stereotypes_prejudices_and_ethnic_relations
107. The Fate of the Circassian Community in Iraq between the Struggle for Survival and Formal Recognition - IOSR Journal, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2024%20Issue2/Series-5/L2402058387.pdf
108. Studying Kurdishness in Turkey: A review of existing research - PubMed, accessed June 19, 2025, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39817618/

109. The sons of two fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923 - Calhoun, accessed June 19, 2025, https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/61334250-b338-4d15-8ce3-591cf18e7b1e/content
110. Changing Borders and Women as the Narrator: The Case of Syrian Circassians, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.iccsor.com/index.php/jatss/article/view/212
111. United Kurdish Delegation Heads to Damascus Amid Progress in Syria Talks, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.syriandemocratictimes.com/2025/06/06/united-kurdish-delegation-heads-to-damascus-amid-progress-in-syria-talks/
112. Turkification - Wikipedia, accessed June 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkification
113. Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma (Chapter 4) - Multiculturalism in Turkey - Cambridge University Press, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/multiculturalism-in-turkey/turkeys-kurdish-dilemma/9C0230AB751E8DA323E47C5BC6C8B0FE
114. Recognizing the rights of minorities in Türkiye – Q&A with Dr Yasemin Oral, accessed June 19, 2025, https://minorityrights.org/recognizing-the-rights-of-minorities-in-turkiye-qa-with-dr-yasemin-oral/
115. Summer Institute in Kurdish Language and Culture - Northeastern Illinois University, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.neiu.edu/academics/advising-tutoring-support/advising-tutoring-centers/multilingual-learning-center/summer-institute-kurdish-language-and-culture
116. Education Program | Americankurdishcom - American Kurdish Committee, accessed June 19, 2025, https://www.americankurdishcommittee.org/copy-of-outreach-program
117. Circassian Nationalism - 1914-1918 Online, accessed June 19, 2025, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/circassian_nationalism
118. accessed January 1, 1970, httpsa://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/2242383